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In this paper we explore the link between the intensity of product market competition and 
inflation rates across EU countries and sectors. We consider long-term averages of inflation 
rates in order to remove the cyclical behavior of inflation over time and as alternative proxies 
of competition we use the level of mark-up, profit margin, the profit rate and a survey based 
“intensity of competition” variable. 
Results for both aggregate and sectoral panels show that the extent of product market 
competition, as proxied by the level of mark-up in particular, is an important driver of 
inflation. Notwithstanding some caveats associated with the measurement of the proxies of 
competition used, our findings suggest that higher product market competition reduces 
average inflation rates for a prolonged period of time. Moreover, results both at the 
aggregate and sectoral level are generally confirmed by a wide set of robustness tests.  
 
Keywords: Inflation, Competition, Estimation and Panel Data Analysis. 




Working Paper Series No. 453
March 2005Non-technical summary 
 
The role of product market reforms in achieving the objective of higher and sustainable non-
inflationary growth has recently received a lot of attention amongst policy makers and 
academics. The economic literature has explored quite extensively the link between product 
market competition and the price level, concluding that higher competition leads to a lower 
price level. The investigation of the relationship between product market competition and 
inflation is however less prominent (Neiss (2001) and Cavelaars (2003)) and represents the 
focus of this work. 
In this paper, we examine the link between product market competition and price formation, 
which persists for a prolonged period of time, i.e. which goes beyond temporary effects. To 
this end, in order to remove the cyclical behavior of inflation, we consider long-term averages 
of inflation rates for a panel of EU countries and sectors. Given that product market 
competition cannot be measured directly, we use as alternative proxies the level of mark-up, 
profit margin, the profit rate and a survey based “intensity of competition” variable. 
Our paper contributes to the literature in several ways. First, compared to the existing 
literature, the paper focuses on a longer time-horizon (1980-2001) and on a panel of EU 
countries. Second, alternative proxies of product market competition are used and critically 
assessed in order to evaluate which proxy performs better. Third, the analysis is extended to a 
sectoral level and this empirical investigation has received limited attention in the literature 
especially as far as the study of EU countries is concerned. This extension entails the use of 
panel data analysis.  
Results for both the aggregate and sectoral panels indicate that competition in product 
markets plays an important role in explaining average inflation rates across countries and 
sectors. In particular, our findings suggest that higher product market competition reduces 
average inflation rates for a prolonged period of time, thus empirically confirming the 
economic rationale of our investigation. The negative relationship between competition and 
average inflation continues to hold when controlling for country size, monetary policy, 
country openness and the level of country development. Moreover, results both at the 
aggregate and sectoral level are generally confirmed by a wide set of robustness tests. This 
entails both testing for alternative proxies of product market competition and for different 
specification of the estimation models.  
Notwithstanding the empirical difficulties in measuring product market competition and the 
fact that some methodological caveats and some data limitation may play a role, we can 
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March 2005income share, performs best in explaining average inflation rates both at an aggregate and a 
sectoral level. 
The policy implications of this paper are twofold. First, the empirical evidence that higher 
product market competition leads to lower average inflation rates appears to be robust and 
confirms previous findings. Second, the claim of policy makers and central banks to urge 
progress in product market reforms is supported by the fact that this is likely to lead to a 
permanently lower level of inflation. However, it is worth stressing that conclusions should be 
assessed with caution given that in the period considered, 1980-2001, some other factors 
affecting inflation and going beyond the effect of product market competition might have also 
played a role. Moreover, average inflation rates in the sample period examined were 
significantly higher than in the euro area or in the EU now and this is likely to imply that the 
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1.  Introduction 
There is a high degree of interest among policy makers and academics regarding the role 
played by structural reforms to achieve the objective of higher and sustainable non-
inflationary growth. Product market reforms are likely to promote a more competitive 
economic environment. If higher product market competition reduces inflation, and therefore 
contributes to a more stable macroeconomic environment, this is likely to be beneficial for 
growth and would support the policy call of speeding-up structural reforms to meet the 
objectives set-up within the Lisbon agenda. 
The economic literature has explored quite extensively the link between product market 
competition and the price level, concluding that higher competition leads to a lower price 
level (see for example Armstrong and Vickers (1993), ECB (2001), ECB (2002), Economist 
Intelligence Unit (2001), European Commission (2001)). The intuition for this result is that 
higher competition stimulates a more efficient use and allocation of resources thereby 
triggering price reductions and a temporary downward pressure on the inflation rate. The 
degree of product market competition is also likely to affect firms’ pricing behaviour and the 
extent of inflation persistence
2. Fabiani, Gattulli and Sabbatini (2004) find that, in the case of 
a demand shock, Italian firms tend to change prices less promptly in a non-competitive 
environment. This finding is in line with theoretical predictions suggesting that the higher the 
degree of competition the more a firm’s pricing strategy is likely to be affected by the 
behaviour of its competitors (see also Martin (1993)). The investigation of the relationship 
between product market competition and inflation is however less prominent in the literature 
(Neiss (2001) and Cavelaars (2003)) and represents the focus of this paper. Concentrating on 
inflation rates rather than on the price levels, we are interested in finding possible links 
between product market competition and price formation which persist for a prolonged period 
of time, i.e. which go beyond temporary effects. 
In this paper, we explore the link between the intensity of product market competition and 
inflation rates across countries and sectors. To this end, in order to remove the cyclical 
behavior of inflation, we consider long-term averages of inflation rates for a panel of EU 
countries and sectors
3. Given that product market competition cannot be measured directly, 
                                                           
2 Several papers dealing with inflation persistence and presenting research within the Eurosystem 
Inflation Persistence Network can be found under http://www.ecb.int/pub/html/index.en.html. 
 
3 A possible interesting extension of this paper could be to use yearly inflation rates rather then long-
term averages and insert a measure of output gap among the explanatory variables in order to take into 
account cyclical variations in inflation rates. Adding a temporal dimension would also allow the 
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March 2005we use as alternative proxies the level of mark-up, profit margin, the profit rate and a survey 
based “intensity of competition” variable. 
Our paper contributes to the literature in several ways. First, compared to the existing 
literature, the paper focuses on a longer time-horizon (1980-2001) and on a panel of EU 
countries. Second, alternative proxies of product market competition are used in order to 
assess which proxy performs better. Third, the analysis is extended to a sectoral level, this 
empirical investigation has received less attention in the literature especially as far as the 
study of EU countries is concerned
4. This extension entails the use of panel data analysis. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 focuses on the methodology 
presenting the economic rationale of the investigation, the different proxies of product market 
competition used and the estimation models. Section 3 describes the aggregate and sectoral 
data used. Empirical results for the aggregate and sectoral samples together with robustness 
tests are presented in section 4 and 5 respectively. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2.  The Methodology 
In this section we focus on the methodology used. In section 2.1 we discuss the economic 
rationale of our investigation, in section 2.2 we present the different proxies of competition 
used in the empirical analysis and in section 2.3 we describe the econometric methodology 
used. 
2.1. Macroeconomic rationale 
The rationale to claim that the inflation rate is affected by the intensity of product market 
competition is twofold. First, in an economy characterised by product market imperfections 
and rigidities, the central bank could have an incentive to set actual inflation above expected 
inflation as a means to raise output growth. This well-known argument has been originally put 
forward by Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Barro and Gordon (1983) and is known in the 
literature as the dynamic inconsistency theory. The argument can be formalised as follows: 
                                                                                                                                                                      
curve framework. These extensions go however beyond the scope of the paper of investigating the 
effects of product market competition on inflation rates. 
4 Symeonidis (2001) analysed the impact of price competition on endogenous innovative output, 
market structure and profitability in R&D-intensive manufacturing industries in the UK. He found that 
an intensification of price competition, determined by an exogenous institutional change, had no 
significant effect on innovation output while it caused a rise in concentration in the industries 
examined. Leith and Malley (2003) developed a sectoral model of firms’ pricing behaviour for US 
manufacturing industries and found that firms with more market-power, as measured by a higher mark-
up, adjust prices less frequently than firms in more competitive industries. Sauner-Leroy (2003) used 
company level data for a panel of EU countries and showed that falls in price costs margins between 
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1 2 * 2 y y L θ λ π − + =  [1] 
Where L indicates a loss function, π the inflation rate, y and y* actual and potential output 
growth respectively, λ > 0 the central bank’s weight attached to output growth and θ > 1 is a 
measure of the degree of distortions in the economy
5. The objective function considered is 
based upon the assumption, widely used in the literature, that monetary authorities dislike 
departure of actual output and inflation from their respective target values
6. 
The existence of distortions could be due to the presence of imperfect competition as 
proposed by Lane (1997) and Neiss (2001) or other forms of product market rigidities such as 
state control, strict product market regulation or distortionary taxation as in Beetsma and 
Bovenberg (1999). Notwithstanding the focus of the paper on product markets, the parameter 
θ could also capture labour market rigidities such as the wedge between the monopoly level 
of employment and the competitive level or the degree of employment protection legislation. 
Minimising the loss function [1] and setting actual output equal to potential output in 
equilibrium, we get 
) 1 (
* − = θ λ π y  [2] 
implying that  0 / > θ π d d , i.e. the higher the distortion in the market, the higher the inflation 
rate.  
Empirical evidence supports the idea that increased product market competition is beneficial 
to consumers in term of lower prices in selected network industries (ECB (2001)). As a matter 
of example, increased competition in the telecommunications sector has clearly exerted a 
downward influence on price developments in recent years for a prolonged period of time 
(ECB (2003)). Other studies such as Neiss (2001) and Cavelaars (2003) suggest that product 
market imperfections play a role in explaining cross-country inflation rates and have a 
permanent impact on average inflation rates. 
A second and somewhat related argument can be put forward to claim that more competitive 
economies are likely to experience lower inflation rates in the long run. The more competitive 
an economy, the more flexible it should be in terms of prices and factor substitution of inputs. 
In particular, more flexible prices are likely to render the monetary commitment to low 
inflation more credible (see Rogoff 2003). Moreover, a competitive economy should be able 
to adjust more quickly to unanticipated shocks. If an economy is hit by a negative supply side 
shock such as an oil price shock, the output loss and the increase in inflation and wages 
                                                           
5 The preferred inflation rate   has been normalised to zero. 
* π
6 The loss function described is standard in monetary economic literature and is not meant to represent 




Working Paper Series No. 453
March 2005following the shock are likely to be less severe in a more competitive economy (Rotemberg 
and Woodford (1996)). 
 
2.2. Proxies for competition 
Perfect competition is generally associated with a market structure where individual economic 
agents have no market power and are price takers. In a competitive setting firms produce 
homogenous products, are able to enter and exit the market freely and face a perfectly 
horizontal demand curve. Competition is generally believed to drive market prices down to 
the competitive level equal to the marginal costs. Such a competitive equilibrium is Pareto 
optimal, i.e. it cannot be replaced by another one that would increase the welfare of some 
consumers without harming others.  
A market can be characterised by de facto or de jure competition. De facto competition is a 
case where effective competition exists in the market as described above, whilst de jure 
competition is a situation where competition is “formally” possible given the existing 
regulatory framework, but a limited number of large players still retain a dominant position. 
Additionally, competition can be based on prices (or quantities) but also on non-price factors. 
Non-price competition is common in cases of price regulation. Examples of non-price 
competition include improving the quality of products, providing and extending warranty, 
advertising a product and changing its characteristic. 
In practise, measuring product market competition is a complex task. Given that product 
market competition cannot be measured directly, we need to use proxies. We use mark-up as 
a first proxy of product market competition
7. The mark-up is intended to proxy the ratio of 
price over marginal costs in the calculation of the so-called Lerner index, the ratio of price 
minus marginal costs over price, which measures the intensity of competition within a 
market
8. Given that the direct empirical measurement of the Lerner index is quite difficult 
because marginal costs of firms are not observable, we measure mark-up as the inverse of the 
labour income share in the economy, following Gali (1995), Neiss (2001) and Cavelaars 
(2003). 
Using this methodology is equivalent to assuming that the elasticity of output with respect to 
labour input is equal across countries and, more specifically, using a Cobb-Douglas 
production function 
α α − =
1 K AL Y  this implies that the parameter α is equal across 
countries. In other words differences in technologies across countries are not expected to 
                                                           
7 Mark-up may not fully reflect the degree of product market competition when trade unions are able to 
appropriate large quasi-rents. When an incumbent tries to deter new entrants by cutting prices, mark-up 
could also underestimate the monopoly power of a firm. 
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the relatively homogenous set of countries examined
9. Furthermore, and most importantly, 
this methodology does not explicitly take into account capital stock
10. To this end we have 
tried as alternative proxies of product market competition other indicators that take also into 
account capital stock (see below, for a discussion see also European Commission (2004)).  
As a second proxy for product market competition, we compute profit margin as the ratio of 
operating surplus to output. In computing profit margin we face several methodological issues 
(for an exhaustive discussion see ECB (2004)). First of all, in the national account framework, 
operating surplus includes mixed income (imputed labour income of self-employed). We 
consider two different measures of profit margin: the first one, unadjusted, which includes the 
income of self-employed, and the second one, adjusted profit margin, which excludes the 
imputed labour income of the self-employed, under the assumption that the labour income of 
a self-employed person equals compensation of an employee. Additionally, operating surplus 
can be defined on a gross or net basis (i.e. excluding the consumption of fixed capital). 
Finally, some additional methodological problems emerge in defining the measure of output 
to which gross operating surplus is related. Output can be defined either in terms of 
production or in terms of value added
11. Given that the ratio of intermediate inputs (the 
difference between production and value added) to total output differs across sectors and 
affects the measurement of profit margin, we compute profit margin using value added in the 
denominator. All in all, there are several alternative ways of defining profit margin and there 
is no superior definition fitting all purposes. In order to decide which measure to use in the 
empirical analysis we compute several correlations between competing definitions of profit 
margin indicators and other proxies of competition and choose the one with the highest 
correlation (see Annex Tables 1 to 4). Table 1 below presents the set of indicators that we 
have selected on the basis of this analysis, namely net unadjusted operating surplus over GDP 








                                                           
9 See Cavelaars (2003) for a more detailed discussion. 
10 The mark-up m is however indirectly related to the capital share (KS) given that KS = 1 – Labour 
Income Share.   
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March 2005Table 1: Summary of the proxies of competition used in the empirical analysis. 
Proxies of competition: Aggregate Sample Sectoral Sample
Mark-up GDP / Compensation of employees Value added / Compensation of employees
Estimated sectoral mark-up using Roeger (1995) 
methodology
Profit Margin Net unadjusted Operating Surplus/GDP Gross unadjusted Operating Surplus / Value Added
Profit Rate Net unadjusted Operating Surplus/Capital Stock -
Intensity of Competition Survey variable (WEF) Survey variable (WEF)
Openness Import / GDP -
Indicators of Nicoletti et al. (2000) Nicoletti et al. (2000)
product market regulation  
 
The proxies of competition considered so far do not take into account one important factor of 
production, namely capital stock. To this end, we use as additional measure of profitability 
the rate of return on invested capital or rate of profit defined as: 
K P urplus OperatingS r k / =  
where K is the real capital stock and   is the deflator of the capital stock. Following the 
discussion above we use the net unadjusted operating surplus as numerator in the calculation 
of the rate of profit for the aggregate sample
k P
12. 
Furthermore, acknowledging the simplicity and the possible limitations associated with the 
mark-up measure computed as described above, we econometrically estimate mark-up at the 
sectoral level following the methodology proposed originally by Roger (1995) and presented 
in Martins et al (1996).  This methodology allows estimating the Lerner index B = (P-MC)/P 
using the following equation: 
t t t x B y ε + ∆ = ∆             [ 3 ]  
where 
) ( ) (
) )( 1 ( ) ( ) ( ) (
r k p q x
r k p n w l p q y
n
∆ + ∆ − ∆ + ∆ = ∆
∆ + ∆ − − − ∆ + ∆ − ∆ + ∆ − ∆ + ∆ = ∆ β α β α
   
and q and p are logarithm of gross output and its respective price, α is the labour share in total 
output, l and w are the logarithm of total employment and the wage rate respectively,β  is the 
share of intermediate output in total output, n and p
n are the logarithm of intermediate inputs 
and their prices and K and r are the logarithm of capital and its rental price
13.  
                                                           
12 For a discussion of the link between mark-up and the rate of profit in some euro area countries see 
Pierluigi (2003). 
13 To calculate the rental price of capital we follow a simplified version of the methodology proposed 
by Hall and Jorgenson (1967): , where i is long-term nominal interest rate,  π
k p i R ) ) ((
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and the explanatory variable  is the growth rate of the nominal output / capital ratio. 
y ∆
t x ∆
It is worth stressing that equation [3] provides an unbiased estimate of the Lerner index B 
only in the presence of constant returns to scale. The presence of increasing returns to scale 
induces a downward-bias in the estimation of the mark-up
14. Moreover, the presence of sunk-
costs is also likely to bias downward the Lerner index given that the fraction of the capital 
stock which is sunk has to be subtracted from capital leading to lower marginal cost and 
higher mark-ups. These limitations together with those related to data availability discussed 
later have to be borne in mind when interpreting the results presented in Section 3.2. 
As an alternative measure of product market competition we also use the index “Intensity of 
local competition” published by the World Economic Forum (2002) (WEF) in The Global 
Competitiveness Report 2001-2002. This index is based on survey data across countries and 
is computed as arithmetic mean of responses from 90 senior executives whose companies are 
part of the World Economic Forum. The questions are meant to assess the degree of product 
market competition in local markets. 
We also include in our models indicators of product market regulation, based on Nicoletti, 
Scarpetta and Boylaud (2000). In particular, we use an indicator of overall economic 
regulation, regulation of competition, barrier to competition and intensity of state control. 
These indicators could also be useful proxies to capture the degree of product market 
flexibility and the degree of competition in the economy as shown in Hayri and Dutz (1999). 
Finally, we also consider in the models a proxy for market openness (export plus import over 
GDP) for two reasons. First, we are also interested in assessing the link between openness and 
inflation as done in Lane (1997), even if this is not the main objective of the paper. Second, 
the degree of market openness could be considered as an additional proxy of product market 
competition. 
Having used a relatively broad set of indicators to proxy the intensity of product market 
competition, a natural question emerges - which will be addressed in the empirical 
investigation - which of these indicators appears to perform better in explaining long-term 
inflation rates within the panel of countries examined? 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
the expected inflation rate estimated using a HP filter of the GDP deflator  and δ is the rate of 
depreciation set to 5% across all sectors.  
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In order to explore empirically the link between the intensity of competition and inflation 
rates at the sectoral level we use cross-country/cross-industry data. Some of the explanatory 
variables used are country specific and therefore take the same value within a sector. Moulton 
(1986) shows that the use of OLS to estimate models with variables taking the same value on 
a cluster of observations can produce biased and inconsistent estimates of coefficients and 
standard errors. In order to overcome this problem we apply the approach suggested in 
Nicoletti et. al. (2001) and we estimate the following model in vector form: 
u Z u X iNS + = + + = δ β α π  [4] 
v Z u + = µ µ  [5] 
where π is a NS x 1 matrix of inflation rates in country i=1,2…,N and sector s=1,2…,S,  X is 
a NS x K matrix of explanatory variables in levels
15, iNS is a vector of ones with dimension 
NS,  ,  represents the vector of coefficients we want to estimate and 
the error term u is specified as in equation [5] where, 
] , [ X i Z NS = ) , (
' ' ' β α δ =
S N i I Z ⊗ = µ ,   and 
.  
) ,....., ( 1
'
N µ µ µ =
) ..., ,.. ( 1 11
'
NS T v v v v =
The matrix X of explanatory variables contains both the proxy of competition used and other 
variables that we include in the regression in order to control for other factors that may 
influence long-term inflation rates such as market regulation, country size, monetary policy, 
openness and GDP per capita. Some of the explanatory variables used are not sector specific, 
therefore they take the same value for each sector within a country (see section 3 for a 
detailed description). The notation used above is however encompassing a more general case 
in which each explanatory variable is both sector and country specific. 
µ Z  is a matrix of individual country dummies included in the regression in the case of fixed 
effects estimation or a selector matrix of one and zeros in the case of random effects 
estimator. More specifically, if the conditional distribution of  i µ ’s given X can be viewed as 
identical across i, then fixed effects estimation should be performed and this implies 
substituting [5] into [4] and estimating directly the resulting equation using a least-squares-
dummy-variables (LSDV) approach. If the  i µ ’s can be seen as randomly drawn from a 
                                                           
15 Most of the explanatory variables used are computed as ratios over GDP or value added. We have 
taken averages of the levels of the explanatory variables rather than averages of growth rates, given that 
we are analysing long-term averages of inflation rates and we are not interested in cyclical variations 
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estimation the following holds: 
) , 0 ( ... ).... , 0 (
2 2
v is i IID v and IID σ σ µ µ ≈ ≈  
where  s i' µ  and  are independent,  are independent of the  s vis' is X s i' µ  and  for each i 
and s. 
s vis'
Additionally, the random effect specification implies a homoskedastic variance and a 
covariance matrix exhibiting serial correlation over time only between the disturbances of the 
same individuals: 
2 2 ) , ( v jp is u u Cov σ σ µ + =  for i = j and s = p and   for i = j and s   p. 
2 ) , ( µ σ = jp is u u Cov ≠
To test the random-effect specification against the simple linear model we apply a Lagrange 
Multiplier test developed by Breusch and Pagan (1980) and we perform the Hausman (1978) 
test to check whether the random effect model is correctly specified, i.e. if the  s i' µ are 
uncorrelated with the  .  s X i'
 
3.  The data 
3.1. Aggregate Data 
 
For the estimations at the aggregate level we use annual data for the 15 EU countries and, for 
each variable considered, we take the 1980-1990 and 1991-2002 averages. As done in Neiss 
(2001) and Cavelaars (2003), we compute long-term averages because we are not concerned 
with explaining short-term cyclical fluctuations in inflation rates. The aim of the paper is 
indeed to investigate the link between inflation rates and product market competition and the 
latter is considered a structural feature of an economy which goes beyond short-run 
developments. Another possible approach which could represent an interesting extension of 
this paper would be to use yearly inflation rates rather then long-term averages and insert a 
measure of output gap among the explanatory variables in order to take into account cyclical 
variations in inflation rates.  
For each country the inflation rate is computed as the annual change of the logarithm of the 
GDP deflator. We use alternative proxies of product market competition (see also section 
2.2). First, we compute the mark-up calculated as the inverse of the labour income share. 
Second, we calculate profit margin as the ratio of net unadjusted operating surplus to GDP. 
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net unadjusted operating surplus to the capital stock. 
Since we are also interested in the relationship between inflation and the openness of the 
economy, we include a measure of import penetration computed as a ratio of the level of 
nominal imports plus exports to nominal GDP. To control for country size we use the 
logarithm of nominal GDP. The logarithm of nominal GDP per capita is used as a proxy of 
the inflation aversion of each country and as an indicator of the level of its development (as in 
Romer (1993)). Developments in monetary policy, measured as the growth rate of M3, are 
also taken into consideration. As suggested by Romer (1993), to reduce the effect of possible 
outliers in the sample we use logarithms of GDP and GDP per capita in our regressions.  
 
Table 2: Sample statistics, aggregate data 1980-2001 





Inflation  15  5.24 2.99 2.39 12.79 
Mark-up  15  2.00 0.32 1.76 3.02 
Profit  margin  15  23.91 8.48  15.52 48.00 
Rate of profit  14  7.83     2.35   4.38    12.95 
Openness  15  81.82 48.37 43.58 217.74 
Log(GDP per capita)  15  2.63  0.40  1.74  3.16 
Log(GDP)  15  5.14 1.35 2.23 7.18 
Intensity of competition  13  5.80  0.40  5.20  6.30 
Source: European Commission AMECO database, except “Intensity of competition” from World 
Economic Forum (2002), own calculations. 
 
Some summary statistics of inflation and the explanatory variables are reported in Table 2. 
The average inflation rate for the sample is 5.2%, however it differs significantly across 
countries ranging from 2.4% in Germany to 12.8% in Greece. The average value of the mark-
up is 2, meaning that labour earns, on average, 50% of GDP and that labour and profit share 
should be broadly equal. A mark-up of 2 implies that prices are on average twice marginal 
costs and that producing an additional unit of output would yield a 50% “margin” as 
approximated by the Lerner Index. Notwithstanding the difference in the sample and country 
coverage, this result is broadly in line with Neiss (2001) and Cavelaars (2003). The EU 
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sample is 24% and the average rate of profit is close to 8%. 
In Table 3 we present a simple correlation matrix between inflation and the explanatory 
variables. Inflation and mark-up have a strong positive correlation, implying that higher 
values of inflation rates are associated with higher mark-ups. Figure 1 shows a scatter plot of 
the mean inflation rate against the mark-up for each country. A visual assessment seems to 
confirm our thesis that higher mark-ups are associated with higher average inflation rates. In 
addition, we find that the inflation rate is negatively correlated with openness, which is 
consistent with Romer (1993) predicting lower inflation rates in more open economies. 
Furthermore, countries with a higher level of development measured by the logarithm of GDP 
per capita tend to have lower inflation. We also find a negative correlation between the size of 
a country, measured by the logarithm of GDP, and the mark-up. Cavelaars (2003) explains 
this relationship by the fact that when the number of suppliers is relatively large, such as in a 
large economy, a collusive behaviour among firms is less likely to occur. Finally, we find a 
strong negative correlation between the logarithm of GDP per capita and mark-up. This 
would suggests that countries where firms have higher mark-up, indicating a higher monopoly 
power, would tend to have lower per capita GDP, which reflects the intuition that greater 
competition should be supportive for higher output growth (as discussed for example in Hayri 
and Dutz (1999) and Bayoumi, Laxton and Pesenti (2004)). The positive correlation between 
inflation and the profit rate appears to be relatively weak. 
 
Table 3: Correlation matrix, aggregate data 
Inflation Mark-up log(GDP per c.) Openness Log(GDP) Profit rate
Inflation 1
Mark-up 0.85 1
Log(GDP per capita) -0.85 -0.69 1
Openness -0.35 -0.18 0.39 1
Log(GDP) -0.2 -0.23 0.02 -0.71 1
Profit rate 0.23 0.63 -0.16 0.39 -0.26 1
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Source: European Commission AMECO database and own calculation. 
 
3.2. Sectoral Data 
In section 5 we focus on a sectoral analysis. Due to limited availability of some of the 
variables of interest, we limit our sample to 8 EU countries (Austria, Germany, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Italy, Portugal and Sweden). In terms of time coverage, we analyse the same 
sample period as for the aggregate data and we compute long-term averages over the 1980-
2001 period. In our analysis we focus on non-agriculture business sectors only, given that the 
agricultural sector is likely to be affected by distortionary policies at the EC level such as 
subsidies, price controls and the like. Additionally, due to differences in classification across 
countries, we had to exclude mining and quarrying from the sample. In Annex 8.1.2 we 
provide a detailed list of the sectors used (which cover both manufacturing and non-
manufacturing sectors), while in Annex Tables 5 and 6 we present summary statistics and 
correlation matrix between inflation and the other explanatory variables.  
As a measure of inflation at a sectoral level we use the difference of the logarithm of value 
added deflator. We calculate mark-up as the inverse of labour income share and for an 
alternative measure of the degree of market competition we compute profit margin as gross 
unadjusted operating surplus over value added. In the calculation of both mark-up and profit 
margin at the sectoral level we use value added data at basic prices, which include taxes 
levied on production (namely current taxes on the labour and capital employed, such as 
payroll taxes, and taxes on vehicles and buildings). The inclusion of these taxes introduces an 
upward bias in the mark-up calculations and a downward bias in profit margin. However, as 
neither value added at factor price nor detailed information on tax rates by sector and by 
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econometrically estimate mark-ups. Due to data limitation, particularly on the capital stock 
side, we estimated equation [3] for 5 countries and for 14 sectors covering the period 1980-
2001 (see Annex 8.1.3). Mark-ups are calculated as 1/(1-B), where B is the estimated Lerner-
index coefficient from equation [3]. Results are presented in Table 4. Although we use a 
shorter time frame and a different sectoral breakdown and coverage, our results are broadly in 
line with those reported in Martins et al (1996). The estimated mark-up shown in Table 4 is 
generally lower than the average sectoral mark-up computed as the inverse of the labour 
income share yielding an average mark-up of 1.82 (corresponding to a sectoral Lerner index 
of 45%). A comparison of the two indicators is however complicated by the different 
methodology and the different country and sectoral coverage used in the calculation. 
Additionally, we find that the estimated mark-up is positively correlated with the simple 
measure of mark-up defined as the inverse of the labour income share. We generally find a 
correlation coefficient between 0.4 and 0.5 for most of the countries examined. 
Finally, we use a set of indicators (Nicoletti, Scarpetta and Boylaud (2000)) to control for the 
degree of product market institutions in each country. The indicators used for this aim are the 
degree of overall economic regulation, regulation of competition, barrier to competition and 
state control. (See Appendix 8.1.1 for more detailed data description, definitions and sources.) 
 
Table 4 Estimated sectoral mark-ups 
 
ISIC code Sector B Std. error p-value Mark-up
1516 Food Products, bevarages and tabaco 0.12 0.03 0.00 1.13
1719 Textiles, textile products, leather and footwear 0.17 0.04 0.00 1.20
2000 Wood and products of wood and cork 0.16 0.05 0.02 1.19
2122 Pulp, paper, paper products, printing and publishing 0.25 0.10 0.03 1.34
2325 Chemical, rubber, plastic and fuel products 0.18 0.07 0.04 1.22
2600 Other non-metalic mineral products 0.23 0.06 0.00 1.30
2728 Basic metals and fabricated metal products 0.12 0.04 0.03 1.13
2933 Machinery and equipment 0.09 0.06 0.20 1.10
3435 Transport equipment 0.12 0.08 0.17 1.13
3637 Manufactutring n.e.c. 0.17 0.03 0.00 1.21
6063 Transport and storage 0.08 0.09 0.41 1.08
6400 Post and telecommunication 0.37 0.08 0.00 1.58
6567 Financial intermediation 0.38 0.12 0.01 1.61
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1516 Food Products, bevarages and tabaco 0.03 0.06 0.66 1.03
1719 Textiles, textile products, leather and footwear 0.10 0.03 0.02 1.11
2000 Wood and products of wood and cork 0.18 0.08 0.09 1.21
2122 Pulp, paper, paper products, printing and publishing 0.09 0.04 0.06 1.10
2325 Chemical, rubber, plastic and fuel products 0.15 0.06 0.06 1.17
2600 Other non-metalic mineral products 0.13 0.05 0.04 1.14
2728 Basic metals and fabricated metal products 0.19 0.11 0.14 1.23
2933 Machinery and equipment 0.06 0.07 0.45 1.06
3435 Transport equipment 0.04 0.11 0.73 1.04
3637 Manufactutring n.e.c. 0.12 0.06 0.12 1.13
6063 Transport and storage 0.10 0.06 0.18 1.11
6400 Post and telecommunication 0.29 0.13 0.08 1.42
6567 Financial intermediation 0.40 0.08 0.00 1.68
7074 Real estate, renting and business activities 0.33 0.06 0.00 1.50
ISIC code Sector B Std. error p-value Mark-up
1516 Food Products, bevarages and tabaco 0.11 0.02 0.00 1.12
1719 Textiles, textile products, leather and footwear 0.10 0.03 0.00 1.11
2000 Wood and products of wood and cork 0.21 0.05 0.00 1.26
2122 Pulp, paper, paper products, printing and publishing 0.21 0.04 0.00 1.26
2325 Chemical, rubber, plastic and fuel products 0.17 0.03 0.00 1.21
2600 Other non-metalic mineral products 0.24 0.03 0.00 1.31
2728 Basic metals and fabricated metal products 0.15 0.02 0.00 1.18
2933 Machinery and equipment 0.18 0.03 0.00 1.22
3435 Transport equipment 0.12 0.05 0.04 1.13
3637 Manufactutring n.e.c. 0.16 0.02 0.00 1.18
6063 Transport and storage 0.29 0.02 0.00 1.41
6400 Post and telecommunication 0.37 0.02 0.00 1.58
6567 Financial intermediation 0.31 0.01 0.00 1.44
7074 Real estate, renting and business activities 0.44 0.02 0.00 1.78
ISIC code Sector B Std. error p-value Mark-up
1516 Food Products, bevarages and tabaco 0.12 0.02 0.00 1.14
1719 Textiles, textile products, leather and footwear 0.06 0.02 0.00 1.07
2122 Pulp, paper, paper products, printing and publishing 0.12 0.01 0.00 1.14
2325 Chemical, rubber, plastic and fuel products 0.13 0.02 0.00 1.15
2600 Other non-metalic mineral products 0.14 0.04 0.00 1.16
2728 Basic metals and fabricated metal products 0.08 0.02 0.00 1.08
2933 Machinery and equipment 0.18 0.02 0.00 1.21
3435 Transport equipment 0.08 0.02 0.00 1.09
3637 Manufactutring n.e.c. 0.11 0.02 0.00 1.12
6063 Transport and storage 0.17 0.02 0.00 1.21
6400 Post and telecommunication 0.47 0.08 0.00 1.88
6567 Financial intermediation 0.22 0.04 0.00 1.29
7074 Real estate, renting and business activities 0.47 0.01 0.00 1.90
ISIC code Sector B Std. error p-value Mark-up
1516 Food Products, bevarages and tabaco 0.11 0.01 0.00 1.12
1719 Textiles, textile products, leather and footwear 0.12 0.01 0.00 1.14
2000 Wood and products of wood and cork 0.12 0.01 0.00 1.14
2122 Pulp, paper, paper products, printing and publishing 0.14 0.01 0.00 1.16
2325 Chemical, rubber, plastic and fuel products 0.12 0.02 0.00 1.14
2600 Other non-metalic mineral products 0.19 0.01 0.00 1.24
2728 Basic metals and fabricated metal products 0.11 0.01 0.00 1.13
2933 Machinery and equipment 0.14 0.01 0.00 1.16
3435 Transport equipment 0.10 0.01 0.00 1.11
3637 Manufactutring n.e.c. 0.13 0.01 0.00 1.14
6567 Financial intermediation 0.28 0.02 0.00 1.40
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In section 4.1 we investigate whether product market competition, proxied by the level of 
mark-up, can explain cross-country variation in average inflation rates within the aggregate 
sample panel examined consisting of the 15 EU countries. In section 4.2 we investigate the 
robustness of these results. 
 
4.1. Regression results 
In order to investigate the link between product market competition and average inflation 
rates at an aggregate level we compute the averages of inflation rates and the explanatory 
variables for two decades, the 1980s and the 1990s
16. We estimate a panel of 15 EU countries 
using a fixed effects (FE) estimation or random effects GLS estimation method (RE GLS) 
depending on the result of the Hausman test implemented. The Lagrange Multiplier test for 
random effects as suggested by Breusch-Pagan
17 (1980) is also reported. The main estimation 
results are reported in Table 5. The first column shows the FE estimation results of a baseline 
specification where inflation is explained by mark-up without any additional explanatory 
variables. In the second column we insert M3 growth to control for monetary policy 
developments and in the third column we add the logarithm of GDP per capita. Finally, in the 
fourth column we also add a measure of openness (export plus import over GDP) and control 
for country size. The third and fourth specifications are estimated using RE GLS. 
In the first specifications (columns 1), mark-up is statistically significant at the 1% level and 
the estimated coefficients are always correctly signed, indicating a positive relationship 
between mark-up and inflation. Since higher mark-ups are associated with less competition, 
our findings suggest that lower product market competition is likely to be associated with 
higher inflation rates. Results are broadly confirmed when controlling for monetary policy 
developments in terms of M3 growth
18. The estimated coefficient of mark-up is slightly less 
significant than in the first specification (column 2) but the goodness of fit in terms of R 
squared is significantly improving. 
 
 
                                                           
16 In order to increase the number of observations available, we take the 1980-1990 and 1991-2001 
averages instead of averages for the entire sample period as done in the sectoral analysis. Results 
obtained using averages over the 1980-2001 period basically confirm our findings. 
17 The null hypothesis of this test is  . It is worth to stress that results of this test should be treated 
with cautious given the potentially poor approximation of the test statistic in small samples (see 
Moulton and Randolph (1989) for a discussion). 
0
2 = µ σ
18 We do not control for monetary policy independence, as done for the sectoral sample covering the 
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1234
Estimation Method FE FE RE, GLS RE, GLS
Constant -10.9 -4.92 14.61 18.33
(2.72) (2.4) (4.14) (4.69)
[0.0] [0.05] [0.03] [0.0]
Mark-up 8.12 2.90 2.96 2.56
(1.35) (1.47) (1.36) (1.36)













R2 0.29 0.77 0.75 0.77
Breusch-Pagan - - 0.37 0.61
Hausman test - (0.02) (0.11) (0.53)  
Note: standard errors are reported in parentheses and p-values in square brackets.  
 
Adding the logarithm of GDP per capita, a proxy of the level of development in each country, 
does not affect the significance of the mark-up and considerably increases the goodness of fit 
in terms of R squared (see column 3 in Table 5) compared to the first specification. The 
coefficient on the logarithm of GDP per capita is negative and highly significant. This result 
is consistent with the notion that richer countries tend to have higher aversion for inflation 
and thus a lower optimal level of inflation tax (Lane (1997)). Controlling for country 
openness does not substantially change the results, with mark-up becoming slightly less 
significant and the fit of the model improving slightly (column 4 in Table 5). The estimated 
coefficient on openness is however not significant, contrary to earlier findings by Romer 




In order to assess the robustness of the results reported in the previous section we repeat the 
analysis using three alternative proxies of product market competition. First, we substitute 
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20 and run the same set of regressions. Table 6 below 
shows the results of the estimations. The estimated coefficients for profit margin are correctly 
signed, however not statistically significant in the second specification. Results previously 
found for the other explanatory variables inserted are broadly confirmed.  
 
Table 6: Inflation explained by profit margin and a set of explanatory variables. 
1234
Estimation Method FE FE RE, GLS RE, GLS
Constant -1.43 -15.25 18.21 21.3
(1.36) (9.6) (3.17) (3.42)
[0.31] [0.12] [0.0] [0.0]
Profit Margins 0.28 0.09 0.10 0.10
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)













R2 0.33 0.77 0.74 0.77
Breusch-Pagan - 0.61 0.80 0.61
Hausman test - (0.04) (0.33) (0.67)  
Note: standard errors are reported in parentheses and p-values in square brackets.  
 
Second, we substitute mark-up with a measure of profit rate (net unadjusted operating surplus 
over capital stock) and run the same set of regressions
21. Table 7 below shows the results of 
the estimations. Once we control for other explanatory variables, the rate of profit is not 





                                                           
20 As described in detail in section 2.2, we have used the ratio of net operating surplus unadjusted for 
the imputed labour share of self-employed over GDP. We also repeated the analysis using gross 
unadjusted operating surplus over GDP obtaining similar findings. 
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123
Estimation Method FE RE, GLS RE, GLS
Constant -0.23 21.1 23.1
(2.1) (2.8) (3.22)
[0.9] [0.0] [0.0]
Profit Rate 0.7 0.16 0.32
(0.26) (0.18) (0.21)
[0.01] [0.4] [0.12]









R2 0.05 0.72 0.76
Breusch-Pagan - (0.48) (0.81)
Hausman test - (0.51) (0.26)  
Note: standard errors are reported in parentheses and p-values in square brackets  
 
Finally, as an additional robustness check we replace mark-up with an indicator of the 
intensity of local competition taken from the Global Competitiveness Report (2002). Given 
that this indicator is only available for one year, we decided to keep its value constant over 
the entire sample period. We therefore calculated averages of inflation and all the explanatory 
variables for the period 1980-2001 and performed standard OLS estimations. Since higher 
values of this indicator correspond to a more intense competition, we expect to find a negative 
coefficient. The estimation results shown in Table 8 reveal indeed a negative and statistically 
significant relationship. It should however be noted that the sample size of this specification is 
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explanatory variables. OLS estimations (1980-2001 average).  
1234
Const 40.34 37.90 36.10 20.84
(8.91) (5.06) (5.34) (7.58)
[0.01] [0.00] [0.00] [0.03]
Intensity of local competition -6.03 -3.27 -2.34 -1.48
(1.53) (1.03) (1.31) (1.11)













R - s q u a r e d 0 . 5 80 . 8 80 . 9 00 . 9 5  
 
Note: standard errors are reported in parentheses and p-values in square brackets.  
 
The results presented in this section confirm our findings of a negative relationship between 
product market competition and average inflation rates. Countries with more competitive 
markets tend to have on average lower inflation rates. Comparison of the explanatory power 
of the different proxies of competition examined reveals that the mark-up appears to be the 
best proxy while profit margin, the profit rate and the intensity of local competition seem to 
perform less satisfactorily. In particular, the indicator of the intensity of local competition 
looses its significance after the inclusion of mark-up (column 4 in Table 8), implying that the 
mark-up alone is sufficient to capture the effect of competition. 
 
5.  Sectoral Empirical Results 
We extend now the empirical analysis carried out in section 4 for the aggregate economy to a 
sectoral level using the OECD STAN database. Our main interest is to investigate whether the 
results obtained at the aggregate level, showing that a higher intensity of product market 
competition leads to lower average inflation rates, still hold at the sectoral level. Intuitively, 
different economic sectors could react asymmetrically to the degree of product market 
competition and therefore the relation between competition and inflation rates at the sectoral 
level may differ when compared to the aggregate level. In section 5.1 below we present the 
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Our panel consists of 8 countries and 14 sectors (see section 3 and Appendix 8.1.2 for a 
detailed description of the data used). Due to data availability we include only a limited 
number of countries in the sectoral panel in comparison with the aggregate panel used in 
section 4 consisting of the EU 15 countries. However, the countries included represent 
approximately 68% of the total average EU 15 GDP in the period 1980-2001.  
First of all, we run model [4] as described in section 2.3 using as a proxy of competition the 
level of sectoral mark-up. Results are reported in Table 9 below. The Lagrange Multiplier test 
for random effects as suggested by Breusch-Pagan (1980) is also reported. We also 
implement a Hausman (1978) test to check the correct specification of our model, namely that 
the  s i' µ are uncorrelated with the  . If this is the case and the null hypothesis is 




Table 9: Inflation explained by mark-up and a set of explanatory variables.  
1 2 3a 3b 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
Estimation Method FE RE, GLS RE, GLS RE, GLS RE, GLS RE, GLS RE, GLS RE, GLS RE, GLS RE, GLS RE, GLS RE, GLS
Constant 2.92 21.09 20.86 2.52 -2.60 -1.16 0.54 -3.01 17.12 17.23 18.83 16.86
(0.45) (3.62) (3.98) (11.73) (3.44) (2.68) (2.91) (3.55) (4.8) (3.53) (3.52) (4.85)
[0.0] [0.0] [0.0] [0.82] [0.45] [0.66] [0.85] [0.4] [0.0] [0.0] [0.0] [0.0]
Mark up 0.56 0.57 0.56 0.58 0.57 0.57 0.58 0.57 0.56 0.55 0.56 0.55
(0.22) (0.23) (0.23) (0.22) (0.23) (0.23) (0.23) (0.23) (0.23) (0.23) (0.23) (0.23)
[0.02] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.02] [0.01] [0.02]
Log  GDP  per  capita -6.79 -6.44  -1.81 -6.13 -6.17 -6.73 -6.08 
(1.32) (1.61) (3.22) (1.38) (1.11) (1.18) (1.37)
[0.0] [0.0] [0.57] [0.0] [0.0] [0.0] [0.0]
Central Bank Independence (col.3a) / M3 (col.3b) -1.86 0.62
(3.81) (0.38)
[0.62] [0.10]
Economic regulation 2.51 1.02
(1.50) (0.84)
[0.01] [0.23]
Regulation of competition 3.55 1.94
(2.17) (1.0)
[0.1] [0.05]
Barriers to competition 1.95 1.74
(2.27) (1.09)
[0.39] [0.11]




2 0.06 0.62 0.62 0.66 0.26 0.24 0.11 0.27 0.65 0.67 0.67 0.65
Breusch-Pagan (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Hausman - (0.80) (0.87) (0.16) - - - - (0.83) (0.72) (0.96) (0.77)
Alternative Specification Test (0.03) (0.65) (0.74) (0.27) (0.23) (0.16) (0.06) (0.27) (0.64) (0.55) (0.92) (0.54)  
Note: standard errors are reported in parentheses and p-values in square brackets.  
 
                                                           
22 In some of the models estimated the asymptotic assumptions of the Hausman test are not met and the 
test cannot be performed. In such cases we have implemented and reported an alternative test, which 
we refer to as “Alternative specification Test” in the tables. This simple test is computed adding and 
subtracting in the random effect specification the average of each exogenous variable and comparing 
the estimated coefficients of the averaged variable with that of the deviation of each exogenous 
variable from its mean. If these two estimated coefficients are the same (null hypothesis of the test), a 
fixed effects estimation does not add information over the random effects specification which can be 
considered correctly specified. The results of the Hausman test (when computable) always confirm 
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Applying fixed-effects (FE) we find that the mark-up is statistically significant at the 5% level 
and the estimated coefficient is correctly signed (column 1). However, the R squared is low. 
Adding the logarithm of GDP per capita (column 2) and applying RE GLS, the mark-up is 
significant at the 1% level and the logarithm of GDP per capita is also statistically significant 
and its coefficient is correctly signed (negative). These results confirm the findings obtained 
at the aggregate level. Moreover, quite interestingly, adding GDP per capita significantly 
improves the fit of the model in terms of R squared. Given that the logarithm of GDP per 
capita is a country specific variable within our sectoral panel, this result suggests that the bulk 
of the variation in sectoral inflation rates in the sample examined is driven by country specific 
effects. This result is confirmed by regressing the inflation rates with country or sector 
specific dummies separately. Sectoral dummies are in general not statistically significant and 
they explain only a small part of the variation in the data whilst country dummies are 
significant and explain a large proportion of the variation in the data. 
In column 3a of Table 9 we control for central bank independence using a measure of central 
bank legal independence computed by Cukierman (1998). The intuition is that a different 
degree of central bank independence across countries may have influenced average inflation. 
In particular, less independent central banks may have an incentive to set actual inflation 
above target inflation (see for example Cukierman et al. (1992)). Consistent to previous 
findings (Miron and Campillo (1997), Neiss (2001) and Cavelaars (2003)), central bank legal 
independence is not statistically significant in explaining average inflation rates over a long 
time horizon. Most importantly, the findings confirm the results of the basic specification 
with mark-up being still statistically significant at the 1% level
23.  Given that central bank 
independence does not appear to be statistically significant, in column 3b we control for 
monetary policy using the growth rate of M3 which is correctly signed but statistically 
significant only at the 10% level. Mark-up continues to be statistically significant in 
explaining average inflation rates. 
In columns 4 to 7 of Table 9, we report results when we add country specific indicators of 
product market institutions in the models. Mark-up continues to be statistically significant 
even controlling for other measures of market regulation, namely economic regulation, 
regulation of competition, barriers to competition and state control. These indicators are 
generally not statistically significant. It is worth stressing that these results should be taken 
with great caution given that all indicators of market regulation are available for 1998 only 
                                                           
23 As a robustness test we have also investigated the significance of a variable measuring the length of 
central bank independence, computed as the number of years since a central bank achieved legal 
independence. This variable is also not statistically significant and the results obtained for the basic 
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estimations adding log of GDP per capita (column 8 to 11) and our results are confirmed.  
As an additional exercise we perform some simulations using the estimation results obtained 
in Table 9 column 2 and Table 5 column 3 (aggregate sample), i.e. using the model 
specifications which make use of mark-up and the logarithm of GDP per capita. An increase 
in competition resulting from a 10% reduction in mark-up would induce an average reduction 
in the long-term inflation rate by 0.6% in the aggregate sample and by 0.1% in the sectoral 
sample. These simulations have to be taken with great caution and should be considered more 
as an illustration than as an estimate. In particular, the difference in the results between the 
aggregate and the sectoral sample may also be linked to the fact that average inflation is 
higher in the aggregate sample due to a different country coverage
24. In the aggregate sample 
covering the 15 EU countries, average inflation in the period 1980-2001 is 5.2% compared to 
an average of 3.9% in the sectoral sample consisting of 8 countries. Moreover, it is worth 
stressing that the quantitative simulations described refer to an average over countries and 
time (1980-2001), implying that results may differ significantly for each country or 
considering a different time horizon. 
 
5.2. Robustness 
As for the aggregate sample, we repeat the estimations using as alternative proxy of product 
market competition sectoral profit margin. Results are reported in Table 10 below. Sectoral 
profit margin is not statistically significant in explaining average inflation rates (column 1). 
Moreover, given that RE GLS estimation is not appropriate in most of the specifications, 
performing FE estimation has the disadvantage that country specific explanatory variables, 
that are the same across sectors, are dropped from the estimation. However, when RE GLS 
can be implemented, (column 5 and 6), other indicators of regulation such as regulation of 
competition and barrier to competition seem to perform better than profit margin in 
explaining average inflation rates. In these specifications profit margin continues not to be 
statistically significant in explaining average inflation. One of the reasons for the poor 
performance of profit margin as a proxy of competition at the sectoral level could be the fact 
that, due to data limitations, profit margins are computed using gross rather than net operating 
surplus (see Appendix 8.1.2). Gross operating surplus includes the consumption of fixed 
capital (reduction in the value of assets over time) which varies across sectors due, for 
example, to the different degree of capital intensity. Using gross operating surplus could 
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Random effects GLS estimations. 
12345 6789 1 0 1 1
Estimation Method FE FE FE FE RE, GLS RE, GLS FE FE FE FE FE
Constant 2.51 2.51 2.51 2.51 -0.80 -0.21 2.51 2.51 2.51 2.51 2.51
(0.54) (0.54) (0.54) (0.54) (0.88) (1.19) (0.54) (0.54) (0.54) (0.54) (0.54)
[0.0] [0.0] [0.0] [0.0] [0.36] [0.86] [0.0] [0.0] [0.0] [0.0] [0.0]
Profit margins 1.61 1.61 1.61 1.61 2.02 1.94 1.61 1.61 1.61 1.61 1.61
(1.24) (1.24) (1.24) (1.24) (1.25) (1.26) (1.24) (1.24) (1.24) (1.24) (1.24)
[0.2] [0.2] [0.2] [0.2] [0.11] [0.13] [0.2] [0.2] [0.2] [0.2] [0.2]
Log GDP per capita dropped dropped dropped dropped dropped dropped
Central Bank Independence / M3 growth dropped
Economic regulation dropped dropped
Regulation of competition 2.72 dropped
(0.64)
[0.0]
Barriers to competition 2.14 dropped
(0.86)
[0.01]
State control dropped dropped
R
2 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.40 0.28 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11
Breusch-Pagan (0.01) (0.00)
H a u s m a n ---- ( 0 . 0 0 ) ------
Alternative Specification Test (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.11) (0.14) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)  
 
Note: standard errors are reported in parentheses and p-values in square brackets.  
 
To further explore the robustness of our results, we test as an alternative measure of product 
market competition the intensity of local competition measured by the World Economic 
Forum. Given that this proxy of competition is not available over the sample period 
considered, we use available data for 2001 for the entire sample. Notwithstanding this data 
limitation, the measure of intensity of competition proves to be highly significant in all the 
specifications chosen (see Table 11 column 1 to 3), confirming the results obtained for the 
aggregate panel. 
Finally, we add to the county and sector dimensions examined so far in the sectoral panel a 
temporal dimension. As done in the aggregate sample, we compute the average inflation rates 
in the period 1980-1990 and 1991-2001. Taking averages of 10 years for the inflation rates 
we remove cyclical fluctuations and we are able to test the stability over time of the 
relationship between inflation rates and product market competition. To this end, we include a 
time dummy variable in the models
25. Results of FE estimations are reported in Table 11 
below (column 4 and 5) and confirm the main findings obtained. Adding a temporal 
dimension, mark-up is still highly significant in explaining average inflation rates also when 
adding log of GDP per capita. 
                                                                                                                                                                      
24 Moreover, different measures of inflation have been used at the aggregate and sectoral level (see 
Appendix 8.1). 
25 An alternative, computationally more costly way to deal with a panel with three dimensions 
(countries, sectors and time) is also suggested in Hsiao (2003) pg. 302 and consists of transforming the 
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Estimation method LSDV RE, GLS RE, GLS FE FE
Constant 102.46 36.03 34.33 11.56 32.50
(8.02) (4.36) (4.85) (0.66) (3.23)
[0.0] [0.0] [0.0] [0.0] [0.0]
Mark-up 0.56 0.51 0.49
(0.23) (0.2) (0.18)
[0.01] [0.01] [0.01]
Log GDP per capita -5.63  -5.48  -12.28 
(0.83) (0.92) (1.86)
[0.0] [0.0] [0.0]
Intensity of competition -17.29  -2.95  -2.90 
(1.44) (0.85) (0.94)
[0.0] [0.0] [0.0]
Country dummy yes - - - -
Time dummy - - - yes yes
R
2 0.72 0.69 0.70 0.38 0.70
Breusch Pagan - 0.27 0.23 - -
Hausman - - 0.91 - 0.07
Alternative Specification Test 0.00 0.00
1980-2001 average Panel t=2
 
 
Note: standard errors are reported in parentheses and p-values in square brackets.  
 
Finally, for the limited number of countries and sectors available, we use the estimated 
sectoral mark-up reported in Table 4 as an explanatory variable. We find however that this 
indicator is not statistically significant in explaining average inflation rates. One possible 
reason for this result may be the limited number of observations in the sample considered and, 
to a certain extent, the methodological caveats related to the mark-up estimation mentioned in 
section 2.2. A possible extension of this work could be to try to overcome the data limitation, 
especially on the capital stock side, in order to increase the number of countries and sectors in 
the panel. 
 
6.  Conclusions 
In this paper we investigate the link between product market competition, measured by 
alternative proxies, and long-term average inflation rates. We examine first a panel consisting 
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driver in explaining average inflation rates across countries and sectors. In particular, our 
findings suggest that higher product market competition reduces average inflation rates for a 
prolonged period of time, thus empirically confirming the rationale of our investigation. The 
negative relationship between competition and average inflation continues to hold when 
controlling for country size, monetary policy developments, country openness and the level of 
country development. Moreover, results both at the aggregate and sectoral level are generally 
confirmed by a wide set of robustness tests. This entails both testing for alternative proxies of 
product market competition and for different specification of the estimation models.  
Notwithstanding the empirical difficulties in measuring product market competition and the 
fact that none of the proxies of competition used are free from possible limitations, we can 
conclude that amongst the proxies used mark-up, measured as the inverse of the labour 
income share, performs best in explaining average inflation rates both at an aggregate and a 
sectoral level. This is confirmed by testing a wide range of alternative proxies for product 
market competition (the profit margin, the profit rate and a qualitative indicator measuring the 
intensity of competition). We also estimate sectoral mark-up econometrically following 
Martin et al (1996) obtaining broadly similar results.  Data limitations on the capital stock 
however limit the scope of our exercise. Furthermore, indicators of product market 
regulations are, in general, not statistically significant in explaining average inflation rates at a 
sectoral level. 
Regarding the sectoral analysis, we find that the bulk of the variation in inflation rates can be 
explained by “country specific effects” whilst “sectoral effects” seem to play only a minor 
role. A tentative explanation of this result could be that country specific factors, such as the 
level of country development or the extent to which country specific monetary policy 
influence the pricing behaviour of firms, are likely to affect the entire economy rather than 
some specific sectors. Further investigation in this area could be an interesting field for future 
research with the aim of defining and testing other sector specific proxies of competition. 
Another interesting extension of this analysis would be the inclusion of non EU countries in 
the panel. 
The policy implications of this paper are twofold. First, the empirical evidence that higher 
product market competition leads to lower average inflation rates for a prolonged period of 
time appears to be robust and confirms previous findings. Second, the claim of policy makers 
and central banks to urge progress in product market reforms is supported by the fact that this 
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period considered, 1980-2001, some other factors affecting inflation and going beyond the 
effect of product market competition might have played a role. Amongst those factors a major 
one was the introduction of the Single Market in 1992. Moreover, average inflation rates in 
the sample period examined were significantly higher than in the euro area or in the EU now 
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8.1. Data Description 
Aggregate Data 
 
Countries: 15 EU Countries. 
Variables used: 
Inflation = log(GDP deflator)t - log(GDP deflator)t-1
Mark-up = GDP / Compensation of employees 
Profit margin = Net operating surplus (unadjusted) / GDP 
Profit rate = Net operating surplus (unadjusted) / Capital Stock 
Openness = Nominal Exports + Nominal Imports / Nominal GDP 
Size = log(Nominal GDP) 
log(GDP per capita) 
Source: European Commission AMECO database 
M3 = growth rate of M3 excluding currency in circulation (Source: National Central Banks, 
ECB). 
  “Intensity of competition” is taken from the Global Competitiveness Report 2001-2002 
published by the World Economic Forum and refers to the year 2001. 
Data for Germany prior to the unification was calculated using growth rates derived from 
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8.1.1.   8.1.2.  Sectoral data 
 
Countries: Austria, Germany, Denmark, Finland, France, Italy, Portugal, Sweden. 
Sectors (according to ISIC Rev.3) comprise both manufacturing and non-manufacturing 
sectors at the 2-digit level: 
 
Sector code  Description 
1516  Food products, beverages and tobacco 
1719  Textiles, textile products, leather and footwear 
2000  Wood and products of wood and cork 
2122  Pulp, paper, paper products, printing and publishing 
2325  Chemical, rubber, plastics and fuel products 
2600  Other non-metal mineral products 
2728  Basic metal and fabricated metal products 
2933  Machinery and equipment 
3435 Transport  equipment 
3637 Manufacturing  n.e.c 
6063  Transport and storage 
6400  Post and telecommunication 
6567 Financial  intermediation 
7074  Real estate, renting and business activities 
 
Variables used (with STAN notation): 
Value added deflator = (VALU / (VALK * VALK [1995])) * 10000 
Inflation = log (Value Added deflator)t – log (Value Added deflator)t-1  
Mark-up = VALU / LABR 
Profit margin (unadjusted) = OPSM / VALU 
Source: OECD sectoral database STAN 
We use gross rather than net profit margin, because of limited data availability and the use of 
different methodologies across countries to calculate fixed capital consumption. 
Overall economic regulation, regulation of competition, barrier to competition and state 
control are from Nicoletti, Scarpetta and Boyland (2000) and refer to 1998. 
Central banks legal independence is taken by Cukierman (1998), Table 19.3. 
Data for Germany prior to the unification was calculated using growth rates derived from 




Working Paper Series No. 453
March 2005 
  8.1.3  Estimation of mark-up 
 
 
a) Construction of variables 
 
Gross value added (VALU) 
dv = ln(VALU)-ln(VALU)[_n-1] 
 
Gross capitak stock (CAPK) 
dk = ln(CAPK)-ln(CAPK)[_n-1] 
 
Gross fixed capital deflator  
GFCD = dGFCF/dGFCK 
 
Rental price of capital (R) 
R = ((i-infl. expect.) + 5%)*GFCD 
dr = ln(R) – ln(R)[_n-1] 
 
Total employment (EMPN) 
dl = ln(EMPN)-ln(EMPN)[_n-1] 
 
Employees (EMPE) 
Compensation of employees (LABR) 
Compensation per employee LABR/EMPE  
dw = ln(LABR/EMPE)-ln(LABR/EMPE)[_n-1] 
 
Labour input share 
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b) Final equation to estimate 
 







and mark-up = 1/(1-B) 
 
 
c) Calculated mark-up is available for the following countries and sectors: 
Country Start  End  Sectors 
DEU 1991  2002  All 
DNK 1970  2002  All 
FIN 1975  2002  All 
FRA  1970  2001  All, except 2000 
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Annex Table 1. Aggregate sample: correlation between different measures of profit 
margin and other proxies of competition 
  Net operating 
surplus (unadjusted
1)












as % of GDP 
Mark-up  0.97  0.63  0.96  0.24 
Intensity of competition  -0.55  -0.15  -0.57  0.07 
1) Unadjusted for imputed labour income of the self-employed 
2) Adjusted for imputed labour income of the self-employed 
 
Annex Table 2. Aggregate sample: correlation between inflation and different proxies of 
competition 
  Inflation 
Mark-up  0.85 
Net operating surplus (unadjusted
1) as % of GDP  0.79 
Net operating surplus (adjusted
2) as % of GDP  0.37 
Gross operating surplus (unadjusted
1) as % of GDP  0.81 
Gross operating surplus (adjusted
2) as % of GDP  0.04 
Intensity of competition  -0.76 
1) Unadjusted for imputed labour income of the self-employed 
2) Adjusted for imputed labour income of the self-employed 
 
Annex Table 3. Sectoral sample: correlation between different measures of profit 
margin and other proxies of competition 
  Gross operating 
surplus (unadjusted
1)












as % of value added
Mark-up  0.07  0.03  0.43  0.35 
Intensity of competition  -0.14  -0.10  -0.33  -0.24 
Economic regulation  0.06  0.00  0.24  0.09 
Barriers to competition  0.09  0.06  0.26  0.19 
Regulation of competition  0.07  0.00  0.27  0.13 
State control  0.05  -0.02  0.24  0.08 
1) Unadjusted for imputed labour income of the self-employed 
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competition 
  Inflation 
Mark-up  0.34 
Gross operating surplus (unadjusted
1) as % of production  0.19 
Gross operating surplus (adjusted
2) as % of production  0.13 
Gross operating surplus (unadjusted
1) as % of value added  0.34 
Gross operating surplus (adjusted
2) as % of value added  0.23 
Intensity of competition  -0.59 
Economic regulation  0.61 
Barriers to competition  0.49 
Regulation of competition  0.61 
State control  0.62 
1) Unadjusted for imputed labour income of the self-employed 
2) Adjusted for imputed labour income of the self-employed 
 
Annex Table 5. Sectoral sample: Sample statistics 
Variable Observations  Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
Inflation 112  3.946469  3.49881  -6.81889  13.72926 
Mark-up  (VA)  112  1.820744 0.797018 1.022296 6.058326 
Profit margin (VA)  82  0.40762  0.150769  0.16614  0.999538 
Log(GDP  per  capita)  112  2.675892 0.390104 1.702312 2.987139 
Intensity of competition  112  5.75  0.3825  5.3  6.3 
Economic  regulation  112  2.487375 0.698377 1.51  3.923 
Barriers to competition  112  1.203875  0.421141  0.303  1.746 
Regulation of competition  112  2.195875  0.637022  1.35  3.495 
State control  112  1.14325  0.432298  0.513  1.966 
 
Annex Table 6. Sectoral sample: Correlations. 








Inflation 1           
Mark-up 0.3213  1         
Profit margin  0.3387  0.7996  1       
Log(GDP per capita)  -0.2969  -0.2069  0.0049  1     
Intensity of competition  -0.5855  -0.0722  -0.3334  0.095  1   
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